Section 1: Short Title

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protection Against Foreign Adversarial Artificial Intelligence Act of 2025’’.

Section 2: Prohibition on Use of DeepSeek to Carry Out a Federal Contract

(a) Prohibition.—Except as provided in subsection (b), no Federal contractor with an active Federal contract may use the DeepSeek application or any successor application or service developed or provided by High Flyer or any entity owned by High Flyer, for the fulfillment, assistance, execution, or otherwise support to complete, or support in part, a contract with a Federal agency.

(b) Waiver.—The Secretary of Commerce may, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, waive the prohibition in subsection (a) on a case-by-case basis if using the application or service is required for the completion of a national security-related objective of a certain contract or for research purposes.

Section 3: Report on Threats to National Security Posed by Artificial Intelligence Platforms Based in or Affiliated with Countries of Concern

(a) Definition of Country of Concern.—In this section, the term ‘‘country of concern’’ has the meaning given the term ‘‘covered nation’’ in section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code.

(b) Report Required.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives a detailed report on the threats to national security posed by artificial intelligence platforms, including large language models and generative artificial intelligence, based in or affiliated with countries of concern.

1. An analysis of censorship laws and capacities by governments described in subsection (a) that could access or influence of artificial intelligence applications.
2. An analysis of the potential and current use of artificial intelligence platforms to further state-sponsored propaganda.
3. The national security impact of circumvention of United States export controls on graphics processing units contributed to the development of artificial intelligence models of countries of concern.
4. An analysis of the privacy and data security threats toward United States data entered or otherwise submitted to an artificial intelligence application, including—
5. How and where United States users’ data is stored, including whether such data is stored within on-premise servers or a cloud infrastructure;
6. Whether United States users’ data can be accessed and used by a government or political entity of a country of concern, including the Chinese Communist Party;
7. The extent to which data collected from the United States contributes to the development of artificial intelligence applications described in subsection (b);
8. The threat that such access could be an economic espionage risk to intellectual property, trade secrets, proprietary information, or sensitive or confidential information to obtain an unlawful advantage;
9. The threat that such access could be a risk to information, including policy decisions, relating to an office or program under the Federal Government;

(d) Form.—The report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Formal Introduction

Mr. CASSIDY (for himself and Ms. ROSEN ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation